The attached PDF is text from a SCOTUS challenge to #Revenue #taxation and the #CORPORATION status of taxed revenue.

Page 542 of the PDF gives specific range of words used, with regard to taxation, repayment of over taxation and the status of court engages, regarding Taxes and property.

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The first Income Tax law, the Revenue Act of 1913, provided: "That in computing net income under this section there shall be excluded the interest upon the obligations of a state or any political subdivision thereof, and upon the obligations of the United States or its possessions.” (Italics ours) In the income taxing acts prior to the Revenue Act of 1913, interest upon Federal securities was expressly mentioned and taxed. (Although sometimes at reduced rates.) See Act of August 5, 1861, 12 Stat. 309, sec. 49; Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 473, sec. 89 ; Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 281, sec. 116; Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 479; Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 257, sec. 6; and Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 553, sec. 27. Those Acts had developed and used the phrase "notes, bonds, and other securities. " Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra. The Act of 1894 was declared invalid by the Supreme Court in the case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra. One of the objections to the statute made by the Court in that case was that it taxed income from "state securities. " The provisions in the Revenue Act of 1913, therefore, with reference to the exemption of interest on obligations of a state was a recognition of the Constitutional limitation announced in the Pollock case, supra. It is of particular significance that the word used in the 1913 Act was “ obli15 i gation " in spite of the fact that the word used in the Pollock case was “ securities." That Congress deliberately used the broader term seems to be conclusively established by the companion provision in subdivision (B) exempting interest on ' securities issued under the provisions of the Federal Farm Loan Act." Point C. The effect of the lower Court's decision is to substitute the term 'securities " for 'obligations ' in the statute. The basis of the Court's opinion seems to be summarized in the following statement: "We see no reason why the construction of the statute should be so broadened as to cover a transaction which had no relation to the flotation of securities." (Italics ours.) (Rec. 34.) Even in its ordinary sense, “as used in common speech," (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189; Old Colony Railroad Company v. Commissioner, (decided February 15, 1932) supra) the term obligation is broad enough to include the duty of the United States to refund overpaid taxes. That using a word in its ordinary sense does not result in a "broadened" construction of it is, we submit, self-evident. The Court, in refusing to hold that the term "obligations " covers the duty of the United States to make refunds of taxes, has not refused to broaden the construction of the statute. It is, we think, more nearly correct to say the Court's decision results in narrowing the construction of the statute. The effect of the decision is to substitute the term "securities " for the term " obligations " in subdivision (C) of Section 213(b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1926. This, we respectfully submit, is an assumption of legislative authority, and beyond the power of the Court.16 Ogden v. Strong, 18 Federal Cases 10, 460; Louisville, etc. Railr